Documento(s) 5 de 13

Haroldo Dilla Alfonso with Gerardo González Núñez

In the early 1970s, Cuban political leaders announced their intention to begin what they called a ‘process of institutionalization’ of the state and the political system at large, which was to include a sub-system of local government. At that time, Cuban researchers and others researching Cuba began to interpret the likely contents of a new, more democratic system.¹ Leaving aside the often unimaginative interpretations of some Cuban academics, which are less useful than official political interpretations, we would like to dwell briefly on various reactions among North American Cubanologists.

Although for some, such as Horowitz, institutionalization and the creation of local government was simply ‘Stalinist, de-politicizing bureaucratic integration,’² other interpretations chose to avoid such indictments and instead focused on a more objective diagnosis, but often with a liberal theoretical approach, which left little room for analytical flexibility. These include Jorge Dominguez and his classic, Cuba: Order and Revolution. For Dominguez, the issue was simply a formalization of the political system and the transfer of the pattern of authority from charismatic to legal and rational considerations. This was to be complemented by regular political consultation at the local level as introduced by a ‘consultative oligarchy’ interested only in perfecting minor details of the decision-making process.³ Meanwhile, for C. Mesa Lago, institutionalization was ‘noted for central control, dogmatism, administrative-bureaucratic features and limited participation, in the Soviet mold.’⁴ In this interpretation, the new municipal governments had only a very subordinate role to play. Archibald Ritter, however, recognized the implications of this process for the broadening of popular participation, even if within the framework of central planning and a one-party system, both factors affecting decentralization of power and the construction of

participatory democracy. These views were shared in essence by Rhode Pearl Rabking.⁵ Efforts in a different direction were undertaken by William Leogrande and Max Azicri on the issue of determining to what extent traditional patterns of participation were affected and renewed, especially vis-à-vis the creation of local government bodies. According to Leogrande, this was a new phase in Cuba’s revolution, one noted for moving beyond the precepts of direct democracy and for recognizing that more than mobilizations in support of the government would be necessary for the construction of socialism.⁶

Naturally, between these usually critical and often pessimistic assessments of the democratic potential of institutionalization and of local government on the one hand and the more successful components of this decentralizing experiment on the other, there exists a chasm which can only be explained by the strong ideological bent permeating this debate. It is also to be explained by the absence of adequate field research in the municipalities themselves. As no theoretical production is ideologically chaste, it would be disingenuous to believe that this chapter will itself escape from a defined ideological proposition. Yet we have tried to avoid traditional approaches that ignore many of the realities of Cuba in favor of one particular paradigm. This essay attempts to analyze an aspect of the Cuban political system whose creation and dynamics have constituted a considerable step forward in democratizing the Cuban state and society. At the same time, the workings of this new system evinces sufficient weaknesses as to lead to the conclusion that we are not in the presence of the best of all possible worlds. The underlying theoretical proposition is that Cuba’s democratic and participatory maturity will only be possible within a socialist framework, so that democracy and socialism appear in a direct and inseparable relationship, whereby the latter draws from the former not just its goals for human realization but, in more pragmatic terms, the very fundamentals of its own ability to govern. This is perhaps one of the most distinct lessons to be learned from the Eastern European experience.

In this article we develop some ideas about the sub-system of municipal government in Cuba. First, we give a brief description of the history and formal design of this system, as well as presenting the design of the research project. Then we analyze the participatory dimension of local government, especially in terms of decision-making. We return to some of the institutional peculiarities, including their horizontal and vertical relations. Finally, we examine possibilities for the development of Cuban municipalities in relation to the entire political system of which they are a part.

The Original Design of Local Government in Cuba

Municipalities in Cuba have a long history. Throughout the Spanish colonial period and especially during the pre-revolution republican stage, municipalities were significant players in political life, increasing legitimacy through the extension of political patronage. However, their role in regard to regional development or in the implementation of participatory structures was much more limited, chiefly because of the prevalence of undue centralization, a perennial lack of resources, and the corruption of local political elites.

With the onset of revolutionary changes in 1959, the system of municipalities was replaced by institutions with limited administrative powers, including the Juntas de Coordinación y Inspección (Co-ordination and Inspection Boards, JUCEI) and after 1965 by the Poderes Locales (Local Powers). The latter were administrative councils with stable local hierarchies and prerogatives delegated by central bodies, which, at the same time, were intended to playa role as mediators in the electoral process. Although JUCEIs and the Poderes Locales may be considered as the institutional forerunners of the present municipal system, the more relevant antecedent was a strong structure of community participation centered on neighborhood-based political and mass organizations. Examples of this were the Comités de Defensa de la Revolución (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, CDRs) and the Federación de Mujeres Cubanas (Cuban Women’s Federation, FMC).

The community became an arena for vigorous participation in support of the new system, for mobilization of human and material resources, for popular confrontation of counter-revolution, and also for political socialization. At the same time, particularly where the FMC was concerned, organizations became vehicles for sector representation and application of differentiated policies intended to encourage advancement of specific social groups. The 1976 creation of the Órganos Locales del Poder Popular (Local Bodies of People’s Power, OLPP), the first municipal system in revolutionary Cuba, was part of the ‘process of institutionalization,’ a project intended to modernize and democratize the political and administrative system in the country. A decision of this nature raised at least three difficult issues for its designers:

• First, they faced the challenge of creating an institutional and legal framework capable of providing local governments not just with delegated administrative powers, but with the ability to govern their respective territorial jurisdictions. At the same time they needed to keep in mind such facts as a centrally planned economy and the predominance of public property.
• Second, this had to be done in a sufficiently democratic manner, not just because of a need to maintain the high degree of popular involvement for which previous stages were noted. There was also a desire to strengthen participation patterns qualitatively by broadening the scope of such processes as leadership selection, public oversight, and popular control over local public administration.
• Third, the process entailed breaking away from political and administrative methods and styles that were deeply rooted in the public apparatus and the citizenry, and their substitution by a new political culture.

In short, the new system was based on the need for a local representative institution, the Municipal Assembly (Asamblea Municipal), made up of delegates elected by the constituencies through direct and secret balloting. An Assembly had the power to elect, oversee and recall both executive (Executive Committees) and administrative agencies, as well as their representatives to the provincial assemblies and to the National Assembly, the foremost state bodies. Considering that citizens, as voters, had the power not only to elect but also to recall their delegates to municipal assemblies, the system amounted to a chain of successive subordinations in which delegation of sovereignty was conditional while its effects transcended the purely local arena. Voters’ recall rights were complemented by the obligation of those elected to be accountable to constituents and to submit to their scrutiny.

This participatory system contained an interesting combination of direct democracy and the use of representation as granted by election. In general, it attempted to provide citizens with the ability to choose the local leadership, express claims, oversee and evaluate local policy and its results, and become involved in projects of community benefit. Thus, although administrative bodies were subject to the authority of representatives, they had the prerogatives and resources deemed indispensable for the practice of government. Above all, the intent was to transfer to the new institutions the control of a wide range of services and economic activities hitherto run by the central government or through delegation of authority. Generally, these activities concerned the provision of basic social services (health, education, social security, employment) or such economic services as repairs, restaurants, cafeterias, building construction and maintenance, and so on. Only in very few cases were these activities related directly to production, which continued to function under provincial or central government control.

The task of planning the transfer of administrative powers raised two immediate issues. The first was how to harmonize adequate degrees of local

autonomy within a centrally planned economy, so as to avoid atomization, resource waste and uneven regional development. The solution was felt to be found in the so-called ‘double subordination’ method, which gave central bodies methodological control of locally subordinated activities such as factories (here referred to as locally controlled). Methodological control referred to control over prices, salaries and consumption norms. Meanwhile local governments were given responsibility for administrative control. The second issue had to do with making municipal government actions compatible with the sum of the territorial economy, which included nationally subordinated corporations (grandes industrias or industrias nacionales, here referred to as national corporations). A set of norms was enacted to prescribe limited jurisdiction of local government over national concerns. This was variously referred to in official documents as a relationship of ‘control,’ ‘assistance,’ or simply of ‘support.’

As expected, although a single institutional and legal model was established, later development of the system was affected by conscious and de facto changes made nationally that affected each local reality. This makes any general assessment difficult, unless it takes into account the fact that significant heterogeneity exists. At any rate, 15 years after first implementation, both the positive and the negative traits of the subsystem of municipal government can be seen — as well as the fact that many of the solutions advanced by the original design have become part of the problem.

Research Procedure and Setting

The previous description implicitly states the two main objectives of this research — that is, the evaluation of municipalities — as: (a) a focus of popular participation in leadership selection, decision-making and implementation of community projects, and (b) government bodies with decision-making, implementation and coactive prerogatives within their respective jurisdictions. For purposes of research it was not difficult to identify the fundamental institutional components of the municipal sphere: citizens, divided at times by their gender, generational, occupational and other distinctions; community-based social and political organizations, including the Communist Party; community representatives (delegates); municipal assemblies and subsidiary bodies; the Municipal Assembly Executive Committee; local administrative bodies; national and provincial institutions located in the territory.

Each of these subjects was studied between 1989 and 1991 through a variety of methods, including interviews, surveys, observation and discussion groups, and by a comprehensive documentary review. In some

cases, subjects proved to be highly complex, to the extent that insights became possible only through the interaction of various research tools at intervals during the project. In-depth, specific research was required by certain situations through the course of the investigation, and this was accomplished by designing specific studies.

Given the lack of previous studies and of a reliable statistical foundation, we decided to select a group of four municipalities presenting traits sufficiently diverse to allow us to obtain a variety of observations which could then be compared. We considered twelve possibilities and selected four of them by combining two basic variables: population size and degree of socio-economic development. First, we wanted a municipality located in the capital, so we chose Centro Habana, which most acutely showed the issues inherent to urban congestion and overpopulation. Second, we wanted a municipality with a well-defined historical background and considerable population and geographic dimensions, so we selected Bayamo, in the east of the island. Finally, we picked Chambas and Santa Cruz del Norte, in the center and western parts of the island, respectively, both small municipalities (population under 40,000) with dissimilar degrees of development.

Proposing to research the municipal sphere in the absence of other considerations implied the danger of ending up with a study of the problems of public policy and administration which ignored the community dimension. Although Cuban municipalities are in effect political-legal communities, from a social and historical perspective they actually represent a multiplicity of communities — a logical result for institutions existing within a political and administrative arrangement barely two decades old. Townships and communities with varying degrees of development and cultural textures coexist within each municipality, occasionally showing so strong a sense of community that they collide with their neighbors. Consequently, although an understanding of the municipality as a whole was considered of major importance for analysis of decision-making, it was not enough for understanding citizen involvement and community dynamics, whose pace and traits were subject to numerous variables, some extending well beyond the merely political.

Thus, the study focused on the main urban center in each selected municipality, which in all cases both possessed a more pronounced urban profile and was the seat of municipal government. Within each district, between five and seven constituencies were chosen to represent two different variables: the type of leadership and socio-economic characteristics. In these constituencies the political community is an extension of the ordinary relationships of daily life, and it was here that we measured both the political conduct of citizens and the process of participation.

Centro Habana

Centro Habana is a focal point for commerce, where the complexities of life in a large city are easily observable. Although this municipality was created from the merger of five different barrios, these were sufficiently interrelated in history to avoid considering the resulting municipality an artificial creation. It would be an exaggeration to say that Centro Habana is a marginal or slum area. Highly efficient health, educational and social security services are available, and unemployment is not a significant phenomenon. Cultural life is intense and an important part of the population is well educated. Nevertheless, one of its more noticeable features is the decrepitude of the housing and the attendant social consequences that may be expected.

We must bear in mind that this municipality, with an area of only 3.5 sq km, is home to over 164,000 persons living in overcrowded conditions in tenements and rooming houses, where it is not uncommon to find scores of people sharing a single bathroom. Most buildings were erected more than 50 years ago and, practically in every case, have never been repaired, so that partial or complete collapses do not constitute spectacular news. Although delinquent behavior is not common in comparison with other large Latin American cities (Cuban figures are low in this respect), the rate is up, and local government and community organizations are responding with preventive policies and integration programmes. An interesting detail is that these policies and programmes are based on recovery of the cultural traditions of the barrios and implementation of community self-development programmes. However, the availability of resources has proved to be insufficient for adequate implementation of these programmes.

Of all municipalities selected for study, it was here that conflict and dissatisfaction indicators were highest, and where local government held the least legitimacy. Of course, this is determined by the inability of local leaders to adopt initiatives in a district located in the center of the capital, housing national institutions outside their control, and burdened by difficult problems caused not just by its own population, but also by the large crowds circulating daily through the commercial areas and using the services run by local government.

Bayamo

Bayamo, in the eastern zone of the country, has many characteristics in common with Centro Habana, but also notable differences. Among the former, we can mention population size — it has 187,000 inhabitants,

two-thirds of them in urban centers. There is also nearly perfect overlapping of the legal municipality with the historical community. This is possibly the most salient trait of Bayamo, a city boasting long-lasting and distinct culture and traditions considered their own by all citizens. Being a bayamés is a condition which gives residents great pride, a fact recalled to every visitor by the numerous monuments and historical plaques in the city’s streets. However, unlike Centro Habana, Bayamo constitutes a highly integrated political and socio-economic system where municipal government discharges its duties with great effectiveness, despite being a provincial government seat and home to numerous national corporations not subordinated to local administration. This fact does not preclude conflict among the different actors in the municipal arena; conflict, in fact, springs up with the spontaneity and frankness that characterize residents. But there is always greater room for the construction and management of consensus.

Probably the most significant issues faced by municipal government are unemployment and the status of women. Bayamo is a paradigm of the prevalence in Cuban culture of discriminatory patriarchal patterns, which are expressed with particular intensity in the eastern part of the country. Although female participation in the workforce is only slightly under the national average, this has not brought about sufficient changes in daily life. Although women have discharged their duties well in municipal and other government posts, only 12 per cent of elected delegates are women (compared to the 17 per cent national average). Strikingly, it is usual for women here to decline nomination publicly on the grounds of spousal prohibition. Even when true elsewhere, this would be considered at least inelegant in other regions of the country.

The unemployed here amount to some 14,000, mostly young people, a fact considered one of the most urgent challenges for local government. Their plight is the result of both high birth rates and significant migration from nearby mountainous areas, a situation only recently relieved by implementation of special regional development plans. Migration has led to a proliferation of slum belts around the city, in some of which community development projects with a strong self-management component are now being implemented.

Santa Cruz del Norte

The Municipality of Santa Cruz del Norte has 40,000 inhabitants, two-thirds settled into 12 urban communities. The largest of these is Santa Cruz, with 9,000 inhabitants. This is a quiet, beautiful coastal town whose inhabitants are interrelated by strong primary ties and where it is possible to

locate anyone by simply asking a passer-by. Nothing here resembles the noisy agitation and the insoluble troubles of large cities. Every problem appears to have a solution and it strikes an outsider that Santa Cruz seems like an ideal place to live.

However, Santa Cruz does have its problems, some of which stem precisely from what is considered the source of its prosperity: rapid industrialization. Of course, industrialization has had some favourable aspects (including greater quantity and quality of human and material resources and an increased ability to attain effective social and economic integration) as well as negative ones (including environmental pollution and the massive influx of a labor force from the capital).

This has resulted in a peculiar dichotomy: nearly 20 per cent of the inhabitants are new arrivals, who, according to one local leader, ‘have their feet in Santa Cruz and their head in Havana.’ Santacruceños normally regard them as intruders, while the newcomers disdain what they consider the ‘uncouth manner’ of the local population. Although the conflict is usually resolved through mutual indifference, it has been a relevant factor in decision-making and has affected participation in various parts of the locality.

Chambas

Chambas, in the center of the island, is a municipality whose population features are very similar to those of Santa Cruz, but with more agricultural activity and rural population. The 8,000 inhabitants of Chambas, the capital, are interrelated by primary links that are probably stronger than those in Santa Cruz. Despite evident development of social services and significant economic investment throughout the jurisdiction, Chambas has changed little in the past two decades and there are no visible signs of dramatic change coming soon. It is not as prosperous as Santa Cruz, but there is no sign of the hardship observed in Centro Habana. We dubbed Chambas ‘the municipality of consensus,’ where everyone seems to agree with almost everything. This appears to be strongly related to the surprising vigor of the local leadership, where women playa decisive role, and to the weight of local traditions, which are more accepting of authority. Daily life in Chambas is permeated by a sense of sincere hospitality, for which our team was profoundly grateful.

From both a political and a socio-historical point of view, Chambas is the weakest of the four municipalities selected for study. The coincidence between legal and historical municipality is almost non-existent, and, save for the resolve of political leaders, there are no centripetal forces such as those present in Santa Cruz. The jurisdiction is divided into various regions

with well-defined centers, usually revolving around large sugar concerns with weak interrelationships. It is not surprising that local leaders have had to make an effort to avoid what they call ‘localism,’ and thus many a local government initiative must be directed towards solving or preventing such conflict. This municipality has seriously suffered the consequences of the centralizing tendencies of the provincial government. Resulting cuts in the size of its administrative apparatus have impaired management abilities and the capacity to respond to population demands.

In conclusion, the municipalities selected were diverse enough to allow for comparison and generalizations that may be considered valid for the entire national spectrum.

The Selection of Leadership: Electoral Process, Conduct and Results⁷

Local Electoral Committees are responsible for organizing municipal elections, held every two-and-a-half years. These committees are chaired by a local leader of the Communist Party and are composed of representatives of various social and mass organizations, as well as by citizens with experience in organizing this type of activity. Committees have several duties, notably organization, mobilization of resources, and guaranteeing strict observance of the existing legal framework. In general, the process can be divided into two stages. Voters grouped by constituency elect delegates to Municipal Assemblies. Delegates then elect the executive of the municipal government, in addition to municipal representatives to the provincial and national levels. Let us first focus on the initial voting process, which we can divide into three phases.

The first may be considered the ‘nomination phase,’ and it takes place through a series of neighborhood meetings where residents decide who from their community is best qualified for nomination. This is followed by open, direct voting on all proposed candidates, until those deemed most adequate are selected as candidates. Each delegate position must have more than one candidate, to a limit of eight. In the communities we observed, slightly more than half of registered voters took part in these meetings, which attracted anything from several dozen to several hundred people, depending on the size of the constituency. Women and seniors are the most frequent active participants, not just in debate, but also in preparing the meeting place, generally a school, small auditorium or other public building, or simply outdoors. Although there is a ritual for conducting these gatherings, they are also noted for a climate of informal debate enlivened by the presence of neighborhood children, for whom these meetings present an excellent recreational opportunity.

In accordance with a basic rule of municipal electoral procedure, no organization may submit candidates or publicly support them. This is intended to guarantee free expression of voter preference and avoid possible external interference.⁸ Nominations are usually put forward by individuals, or informally by a group of individuals. Once the round of nomination meetings is concluded, the second phase begins. The primary objective of this phase is to provide information on the background of the various candidates, so that voters may select the one they consider most adequate to represent community interests in the local government. The information procedure is rather laconic, limited to posting biographies and photographs of the candidates nominated by each constituency. As in the preceding phase, political campaigning and other acts on behalf of candidates are not allowed. Finally, secret and direct voting takes place. All citizens over 16 years old and in full exercise of their political rights (that is, excluding those in jail and those who are mentally impaired) may vote. Voter turnout is very high, always higher than 95 per cent, although this number falls in runoffs. According to our observations, most voters approach the voting booth with very definite ideas as to the candidate of their choice. As a result, few ballots are spoiled or remain unused.⁹ Although polls are open until 6 p.m., most voters cast their ballot during the morning hours. In many places voting constitutes an opportunity for social interaction, during which neighbors chat and generally linger for a long time. It is common to see extended families in attendance.

In more than one sense, this political process constitutes a vital moment in the political life of the nation. Technically, it is the starting point for the constitution of all state delegate bodies, since municipal assemblies receive a mandate to elect both provincial and national assemblies. Seen from another perspective, voting for municipal assemblies provides the single direct electoral exercise Cubans enjoy within the realm of the state, and is therefore an experiment of great relevance for democracy-building and the creation of a culture of political participation.

Above all, since they take place within a single-party system, the experience of Cuban municipal elections may hold an interest that transcends the purely national setting. Its participatory qualities may perhaps be a significant indication of the actual possibilities for the development of participatory democracy within such a political context, including as an alternative to competitive, multi-party systems with their many limitations.

Of course, the participatory quality of any election is directly linked to the climate of freedom in which it takes place, including the ability of citizens to exercise their right to nomination, to select alternatives and to vote without coercive external interference. The empirical evidence we

gathered indicates that local Cuban elections take place in a climate of sufficient freedom to gain legitimacy by the citizenry. This is not to deny, of course, the incidence of compulsive factors such as a sense of civic duty or political or ideological commitment. None of the individuals we interviewed who had made or discussed nomination proposals said that external forces interfered with the free choice of nominees or with the process of voting.¹⁰

Such a contention no doubt raises an eyebrow or two. After all, more than 70 per cent of elected delegates are members of the Communist Party (PCC) or the Young Communist Union (UJC), although membership of these organizations accounts for just 17 per cent of the electorate. For an important group of Cubanologists, this is perceived as overrepresentation of the militancia (the term used in Cuba for PCC and UJC members) resulting from an Orwellian manipulation of the system for the purpose of ensuring political loyalty in municipal bodies. From an opposite standpoint, this fact is narrowly interpreted as explicit indication of popular support for the PCC, and therefore a definite act of identification with the political and ideological values it represents. Although these assumptions appear to be antithetical, they have more than one point in common, notably the assumption that the vote is consciously cast in favor of a militant, voluntarily or not.

Reality, however, seems to lie elsewhere — and not exactly midway between the extremes. The electoral behavior of the communities studied, and consequently the orientation of the vote, seem to have more points in common with ethical considerations than with political-ideological paradigms. When asked which qualities they considered most important in a delegate, most of those surveyed referred to such moral considerations as honesty, solidarity toward neighbors, human sensibility, and so on. Political and ideological qualities were mentioned in second place, with concerns about the administrative and managerial abilities of the candidates ranked only in third place. Fewer than 10 per cent made references to membership of the Communist Party or the Young Communist Union as a desirable quality, although of ten candidates in the five constituencies studied, nine were members of the PCC or UJC. A significant number could not remember whether candidates were militants or not.

Of course, this argument does not pretend to dismiss the weight of political-ideological considerations upon voting patterns, or feign unawareness of the implications inherent in such results, at least in reference to its incidence on the legitimacy of the leading role of the Communist Party within Cuban society. The point we wish to make is that, rather than static readings from either side of the issue, the Cuban community phenomenon as a scenario for participation necessitates interpretations that take political

and ideological factors into consideration, but that do not turn them into the sole consideration. Such an analysis ought to be able to integrate other dimensions, including the sense of community belonging, the strength of local leadership, and the peculiarities of the new civil society. This civil society is crystallizing after 30 years of revolutionary life into a collection of political values, norms and conducts that have become part of the national fabric, however diverse its gender, cultural, generational and existential texture.¹¹ Yet, even if we consider that a climate of freedom is necessary for a genuinely participatory electoral process, we have to recognize that this alone is not sufficient. All elections imply a certain transfer of power (in fact, they are only a chapter in the circulation of political power), so that their participatory qualities cannot be reduced to what the liberal paradigm pretends elections to be. In fact, democratic grading of the vote is directly related to its force as a conscious act of conditional delegation of sovereignty. This consideration was probably in the minds of the designers of the Cuban municipal electoral scheme. Compulsory norms were included in this respect, notably accountability before the community and recall rights, which will be discussed later on.

However, the system lacks the mechanisms needed to go beyond purely individual action and turn the electoral process into a sphere for citizen interaction and accord, and strengthen local leadership. The paradox of this restriction is that the critical factors are precisely those originally conceived to guarantee free exercise of the will of the citizenry. This statement may be illustrated by analyzing the way in which the circulation of information during elections was conceived. As we mentioned, in order to ensure equal opportunity for all candidates nominated by the citizenry, election rules ban campaigning or publicity on the candidates’ behalf. The biography method described earlier is used instead. This is so low-key that it is not a major vehicle for communication. According to our study in Santa Cruz, for example, only 9 per cent of the population thought it was an effective information system, and fewer than one-third had read candidate biographies before voting. The poor dissemination of biographies shifts the circulation of information to primary links among neighbors, conceivably with such unwanted results as the transmission of conservative and traditional stereotypes. Moreover, the biography-based information system, which is intended to guarantee equal opportunity for all candidates, in practice achieves the opposite result. It penalizes such groups as women and youth, whose accomplishments in public or work life are usually more limited than those of male adults.

This is arguably the greatest weakness of the municipal electoral system. It is hard to understate the virtues of a leadership selection process that has managed to avoid demagoguery, mercantilization of the vote and

fragmentation of the populace around patterns of loyalty to a party or political boss. Yet, it must be admitted that the focus on moral values and political conduct as the primary criteria for political leadership has been overemphasized and has created a serious obstacle to the emergence of dynamic, representative leaders who are capable of facing the challenge of power.

Although some of these unwanted results will be analyzed later in more detail, we would like to mention one of them: the under-representation of women. Eighty-four per cent of elected delegates are male, most over 30 years old. If we bear in mind that this is the result of a direct and essentially free election, we can only conclude that old patterns of discrimination, which assign to women certain obligations, including those attendant to their role as mothers, and thus limit availability of spare time for public service, are very much alive and are expressed during the electoral process through the casting of votes in favor of men. The inherent paradox is that women are generally recognized as the most efficient community activists, while the most successful delegates are those who ask for the co-operation of women.¹²

The degree to which this might negatively influence the quality of local policies is a debatable issue. Community representatives receive their mandate from society as a whole and not from a specific gender, generation or other such sector, so that sociological under-representation should not automatically be construed as under-representation of interests. There is no doubt that community representatives try to do their job with great dosages of social sensibility and spirit of sacrifice. Yet, it is not unreasonable to believe that the good intentions of an elected representative are not sufficient for the conduct of a public office requiring an understanding of the complex needs of sectors whose daily lives, motivations and wants they do not fully share.

We must recognize that considerable progress has been achieved since 1976, when the sub-system of local government was first established, including nearly doubling the number of women in local elected posts. Yet, these achievements have been slow in coming, and stronger positive action is necessary. This ought to include substantial reform of the election advertising and information methods prescribed by the system, as well as more dynamic and autonomous organization of individual groups, perhaps in the style of the Federación de Mujeres Cubanas. Although it may appear irrelevant to promote actions that sacrifice the effectiveness of popular representation in favor of sector representation, it does not seem likely that Cuban society will be able to reach higher levels of equality and renewal if reforms are left to the natural course of time.

Participation and Decision-making

In addition to elections, popular participation in Cuba’s sub-system of municipal government takes place at various moments of the decision-making process — from expressing demands to defining the issues to evaluating the decisions made. This is done by means as varied as neighborhoods meetings, involvement in social projects and participation in accountability and oversight bodies, including committees, people’s inspections, and so on. Community-based social and political organizations have a significant role to play in most of these participatory activities, notably CDRs, the community mobilization agent par excellence, as well as the FMC and other more informal, yet locally influential, organizations such as neighborhood and school councils, senior citizens’ associations and youth clubs.¹³

Participation of residents and delegates varies considerably from one municipality to the next, and from one type of activity to another. In fact, although group members surveyed generally said they do not have enough time to conduct their inspection and oversight duties, most agreed it was a useful job from which they derived great satisfaction. In Centro Habana, however, the extent of dissatisfaction was much greater, given the complexities facing municipal decision-making there as well as reduced municipal encouragement of this type of work, which is conducted on a wholly voluntary basis. The type of activity, on the other hand, appears to have a direct bearing on the degree of satisfaction, which tends to be greater in the case of municipal policies that are well focused, have more central support and enjoy better resources, such as health and education.

Of the various types of participatory activities in the municipal arena, arguably the most relevant are the accountability meetings (Reuniones de Rendición de Cuentas, RRC — sometimes translated as Meetings to Render Accounts). These were conceived as a venue for information exchange between government and community; that is, for expression of demands by the population and explanation by the government of the scope or limitations of its work. They also provide an occasion for collective discussion of local issues and possible solutions. Meetings take place every six months and are chaired by the local constituency delegate. Government and administrative officials are usually in attendance, especially when deemed necessary or whenever the community requests their presence.

Although 50–60 per cent of constituents usually turn out (anywhere from 100 to 2,000 attending), audiences often dwindle as the meetings carryon. Meetings begin with reports from government officials and delegates. The heart and soul of the meetings, though, is the debate and discussion that

follows. This period allows the expression of new demands and discussion of the most relevant issues facing the community. The length of RRCs varies considerably, depending on the complexity of the topics debated, the number of accumulated issues, and the skill of delegates leading the meeting, but they usually last 50–60 minutes. Those most closely connected to the community and its issues — that is, women and senior citizens — are often the most active participants.

To what extent RRCs satisfy the objectives for which they were created is a relative question. First, as in other community processes, this largely depends on the type of community and population, and on the ability of local leaders to mobilize resources and effect a satisfactory outcome. It is therefore not surprising that the most dynamic meetings take place in small communities and not in large urban centers, particularly in the capital, where the sense of community is weaker and the accumulated issues are more numerous and harder to resolve. And, as might be expected, some objectives are achieved with greater effectiveness than others.

Let us first consider RRCs as a mechanism for the formulation of demands. Through interviews with delegates and community members, and through our own attendance at meetings, we observed that meetings seemed to enjoy legitimacy as instruments for conveying claims and for providing feedback to government. Although there are other avenues for expressing demands (directly to local or national officials or by meeting privately with delegates), 68 per cent of the 6,571 demands submitted in the four selected municipalities between October 1989 and April 1990 were presented at RRCs. If we consider the existence of demands limited to family or personal issues, which people may prefer to discuss in a more private setting, this figure may be as high as 85 per cent.

The RRCs provide an opportunity for debate and agreement on everyday issues facing people and their community, for the expression and transmission of demands, and for effective transmission of information from the community to both local and national government. Local governments are aware that they cannot afford to ignore the outcome of these meetings — a fact well known by citizens and their representatives.

There are, nevertheless, weaknesses in the role and functioning of the RRCs. The converse flow of information from government to community is more limited due to the excessive formality of the information provided in reports, making it somewhat inaccessible and sometimes boring to the ordinary citizen. This limits the ability of citizens to exercise their oversight rights over public activity. Nor have the RRCs become powerful centers for collective action and accord. RRCs are an occasion for community interaction which is somehow isolated from other forms of interaction and organization. There is practically no previous accord among smaller

organizations such as neighborhood, women’s or youth groups, which might facilitate collective construction of demands. This explains why demands made at RRCs are generally presented in an individual manner, even when they pertain to collective interests. Of more than 6,000 demands studied in the four selected municipalities, only 6 per cent showed some degree of prior group agreement. The only chance to surmount the individual nature of demands seems to occur during meetings, and to a great extent this hinges on delegate ability and leadership. Although it is not impossible to find outstanding community leaders who rally constituents together, obtain support from local officials, and launch self-managed projects without immediate recourse to government authorities, these are the exception. Needless to say, this creates a demand overload for municipal authorities. An inevitable consequence is the regrettable underuse of the population’s participation potential. Arguably, the imbalance between its successes as a conduit for raising and addressing demands and the weaker results of the accountability and accord functions may be a reflection of one of the greatest shortcomings of the community process: a paternalistic relation between the government, on one side, and the community and citizens, on the other. Not only does this work to the detriment of the stated objectives, but, from a strategic perspective, it is also detrimental to the establishment of a society where collective action and social self-management are meant to prevail.

The Institutional Hierarchies of Municipal Government

In any complex social setting, Cuban municipalities included, participation cannot be limited to direct citizen involvement — hence the need for indirect participation through representation. It is therefore useful to analyze institutional relations and the place occupied by representative bodies in the Cuban municipal system. According to the Constitution and its regulations, delegate assemblies are the highest state authority in each municipality. Designers of the People’s Power system granted assemblies a number of electoral, oversight and recall prerogatives in relation to the remaining municipal institutions, including executive committees and the administrative apparatus. Although Municipal Assemblies are required to meet only for one or two days twice a year, they actually do so much more frequently. We noted that local governments complement their scant legislative timetable with informal meetings attended by all or most delegates, so that in fact they do meet to discuss community issues and make decisions practically every month. The agenda for these meetings is set by the respective Executive Committee and submitted to the

consideration of delegates, who may modify it. They rarely do so, at least formally, and prefer to introduce issues for discussion during the course of the debate. Only in exceptional cases do the upper structures, either provincial or national, order the inclusion of some point of interest to them.

We observed that Municipal Assembly meetings are noted for lengthy, well-attended debate, particularly when topics related to everyday community life are discussed. Great efforts are made here toward building and organizing consensus on contentious issues. Unpopular pronouncements are seldom greeted by signs of disapproval, while delegates will applaud a point well made. Treatment is respectful and chairpersons use a democratic style in conducting these meetings.

Apart from meetings, Municipal Assemblies have other means of action. Permanent Work Commissions (Comisiones Permanentes de Trabajo) are perhaps the most relevant. As mentioned, these are specialized groups of delegates and ordinary citizens charged with supervising and evaluating various economic and social activities in the municipality. Work Commissions meet periodically to analyze the evolution of production, economic and social services or other such topics of interest, either at their own initiative or at the behest of the Assembly or Executive Committee. Subsequently, they prepare reports and make recommendations which become mandatory practices for all local state agencies, once they have been approved by the Municipal Assembly. To a great extent, commission work helps to compensate for the rather short time set aside for plenary Assembly meetings.

However, our analysis of the potential of these commissions indicates that they are vastly under-utilized, whether because of the shortcomings of the municipal system itself or because of the manner in which the various components of local government relate to each other. As noted, commissions were created to strengthen the accountability of representative institutions, notably Assemblies. In practice, however, commissions tend to be subordinated to Executive Committees (in fact, members define them as the right hand of Executive Committees), and their appearance at Assemblies is perceived as simply the last step in securing approval for a job which has already been evaluated by the EC.

If we keep in mind that in actual practice the relationship between Executive Committees and administrative authorities is closer than desirable for maintaining the independent performance of either, then it is not surprising to conclude that democratic control over municipal bureaucracies is limited. The same reasons explain why commission reports and recommendations are often not duly taken into account by decision-making bodies even though they have been formally adopted.¹⁴

An objective assessment of Municipal Assemblies indicates that they are important for discussion and decision-making in relation to the issues facing localities, and function well as a means of representing the interests of the population. If we bear in mind that no sustained historical experience of representative institutions exists in Cuba, then we ought to consider Municipal Assemblies as a remarkable step forward in building democracy, particularly at the local level. Yet it would be unrealistic to state that Municipal Assemblies have become actual centers of government power. In everyday life, different variables have impeded fulfilment of this role, even independently of the political will of local authorities.

A primary factor is the composition of Assemblies. As noted, they are composed of delegates elected through direct and secret balloting — by voters for whom criteria of efficiency or expertise are secondary and subordinated to ethical and political considerations. The composition of Assemblies reflects this fact. Although delegates are usually noted for a deep sense of their duty to represent voters, their governmental vocation is less satisfactory. As a result, the more sophisticated acts of governing — for example, discussion of a territorial Economic Plan, the earning ability of large enterprises, or election of the judiciary — are incomprehensible or at least not a major concern to them. Social and other issues which directly affect the community are thus debated more extensively during Assembly sessions. This also explains why delegates openly prefer informal meetings with a flexible agenda, generally focusing on discussion of the issues facing them in daily life.

This situation has been made worse by other circumstances, including high Municipal Assembly turnover following elections (about 50 per cent) and the short duration of their mandate (two-and-a-half years). This means that each term in government becomes a period of apprenticeship and training, which is then interrupted precisely when it begins to mature.

A third factor which limits the role of Municipal Assemblies as an actual locus of government power is the role of the Executive Committee. As mentioned, the EC represents the Assembly between sessions, which legally makes it a permanent body. A repository of the highest state power, its nature is twofold: administrative-executive, as well as representative. In order to meet the first requirement, professional members of the Executive Committee take on control and oversight duties for various social and economic activities within the municipality. They thereby enter into a direct relationship with specific sectors of the administrative apparatus in the jurisdiction, whether locally subordinated or not. However, in order to guarantee its representative nature and strict subordination to Municipal Assemblies, the designers of the system made the status of delegate a condition for EC membership. The intention was that attainment of this

high government office would have to be indirectly supported by popular vote.

Election of the Executive Committee is the last stage of the municipal electoral process and consists of submission of a list of candidates to the Assembly. The list may be modified and is always 25 per cent higher than the number of posts being contested. It is presented by the municipal electoral committee, which is chaired by the Communist Party and composed of social and mass organizations. These do everything in their power to propose persons of sufficient prestige and competence to attract the delegate vote and guarantee at least a modicum of success for the EC. Delegates then hold a secret ballot to elect Executive Committee members from this list. Those elected then meet behind closed doors and elect the three top positions: president, vice-president and secretary.

The method has enough controls to make a satisfactory grade on a democratic scale. Yet the fact is that the process generally results in a hybrid that fails to meet either the representative nature or the functional requisites fully. This method, in fact, transfers a greater quota of power than was intended to local administrative bodies, the most stable institutions, which therefore become the ones most capable of providing continuity to local policy.

Several alternative formulas might be discussed, and probably none would be completely accepted. But if we want to attain a democratic and efficient institutionality, municipal governments must develop a more precise definition of their function and structure in order to create a more open and participatory electoral system than that now in place. The issue of Municipal Assemblies actually becoming the top state body in each jurisdiction is not exhausted by discussion of their relationship with other municipal institutions. This is directly linked to what is in Cuba the sensitive issue of the real ability of municipal governments actually to govern, rather than just manage functions delegated by the central authority.

The Ability to Govern

Evaluation of the actual governing abilities of local government comes to a positive first conclusion. Comparison of the current situation with that before 1976 shows that a great decentralizing of Cuba’s public administration apparatus has been achieved. Whatever its current shortcomings, to which we will refer shortly, local government is able to influence development of territorial economic plans and local budgets, adopt policies and initiatives that exert considerable local influence, and act as a point of mediation for nation-wide development projects. This is very

significant in a country where, just two decades ago, everything was directed in a centralized manner through subordinate institutions enjoying almost no decision-making role.

As noted, various administrative levels may coexist within municipal jurisdictions, including those under provincial and national control. This makes for a fairly complex mosaic, whose impact on the functional exercise of local government is worthy of note. A graphic example is the case of one of the medium-sized municipalities selected for study, where a total of 15 locally controlled bodies existed, including six corporations (housing construction, cafeterias and restaurants, retail, services, etc.), in addition to a similar number of agencies providing government-subsidized social services, including the education, health, finance, social security and employment directorates. Next are dozens of provincially controlled agencies in this municipality. Although their scope extends beyond the purely municipal sphere, they also offer services at this level, where they organize in the form of establecimientos. Grouped in this category are small producers of construction materials, food plants and small hotels. Lastly, territories are also home to corporations whose impact is national in scope and which operate under national control. In the case of the selected municipality, there are about a dozen such corporations, including power plants and agro-industrial complexes.

Given the complexity and asymmetry of the administrative powers dispersed throughout the jurisdiction, there is a conflict vis-à-vis the ability of municipal institutions to govern.

Establecimientos are created from the elimination of municipal corporations, or simply because it is deemed unrealistic to create a new concern and its attendant bureaucracy for small-scale activities. Municipalities exert or try to exert an influence upon establecimientos, but since current regulations establish that these are not decision-making areas, the impact municipalities can have, while greater than is the case with national corporations, is always limited — even when dealing with units that produce essential goods or services.

A national corporation generally has material and human resources as large as or greater than those of a municipality, especially if we speak about localities of moderate size. Municipal government can exert only limited influence upon them. This relationship, officially designated as ‘co-operation’ or ‘assistance,’ takes place through such specialized municipal bodies as the finance, labor, social security and statistics departments. Municipalities receive certain indirect benefits from revenues.

In practice, however, the relationship between municipalities and national corporations is richer and more fruitful than originally intended. National corporations can hardly do without the services offered by

municipalities, which provide essential supplies and the labor force. Also, their significant local impact means that they are affected by municipal needs. These relationships are spontaneously expressed in the transfer of human and material resources toward municipalities for social service activities, as well as in the use of secondary production capacity in meeting local needs.

Many an example could be cited of corporation-municipality relationships with a positive impact upon the community. The fact that these relationships are fundamentally spontaneous — for the law allows for only modest municipal input — makes the real ability to govern depend on such variables as the bargaining skills of local authorities or the goodwill of corporate directors. Obviously, these conditions are not necessarily present and are quite fragile. All this is connected to a key issue of Cuban economic organization, which reaches well beyond the municipal arena: the ability of corporations to make autonomous decisions within their field.

Another area of conflict is the power of local governments to exert real control over activities officially defined as locally controlled; that is, those directly linked to everyday needs — health, education, food distribution, construction of housing and community buildings, cultural and sports services, and so on. According to the original design, these activities are to be conducted under the ‘double subordination’ concept, which grants administrative control to municipal government; this must operate on the basis of ‘methodological indications’ developed by the central government and supervised by provincial government counterparts.

The principle of double subordination is not faulty in itself. It is meant to offer technical supervision to decentralized bodies in order to avoid wasting of resources and services of inferior quality. It is also meant to provide practical training for new local authorities vis-à-vis their prerogatives and function. In practice, the initial concept left little room for local initiative, which was understandable in a context of the creation of new institutions. Fifteen years later, however, at a time when municipal bodies have attained sufficient proficiency, methodological subordination prerogatives seem excessive. In some regions, they have reinforced the centralizing tendencies of provincial governments, which often exceed original premises and dispense altogether with municipal prerogatives in favor of supposed administrative efficiency.

Thus the ability of local governments to govern and not just administer, and in so doing retain sufficient decision-making and coactive authority, has been rather modest. They have generally wound up in charge of those tasks more directly linked to everyday life and to the demands of the population, yet have insufficient resources available for an effective response. In addition, their ability to mobilize human and material

resources at the local level is hampered by ‘methodologies’ handed down from the top and by centralizing provincial governments. As a result, only a very imaginative performance can save local leaders and institutions from the loss of legitimacy that results from being unable to make decisions.

Contrary to what may be presumed, the role of Communist Party Municipal Committees is significant in protecting and consolidating the authority of local governments. This is so not just because of the great political weight of the PCC, but for the more concrete reason that it is the only local institution whose jurisdiction extends to the entire economic and decision-making system in the territory, powerful national corporations included. This is probably why 77 per cent of delegates polled expressed satisfaction about the Party role in local government, although only one-third considered that the Party was involved in this type of activity.

Perspectives

The sub-system of local government examined here is not a mere institutional formality. On the contrary, even taking into account the limitations imposed by insufficient material and human resources and other hurdles noted here, Cuban municipalities have become effective mechanisms for local development and for meeting the everyday needs of the population, either through local initiative or as an arena for national plans. No less important is their role as a stage in the process of building democracy.

However, 15 years after implementation, the sub-system of local government shows sufficient shortcomings to lead to the conclusion that reorganization and revitalization have become primary tasks. This has been officially recognized, and has been placed on the agenda for improvement of the Cuban political system. Consensus about the need for renewal, of course, does not imply consensus as to where and how to renew. This makes the topic a bone of contention at administrative, political and academic levels.

A primary component of renewal is participation. Even considering its undoubted achievements, Cuba’s municipal participation system has been hampered by excessive formality and bureaucracy, so that the final result falls short of what was wanted and planned in the original design. The system has consequently produced an unwanted result in encouraging a rather paternalistic, top-down relationship between local government and the community, all in a fundamentally parochial surrounding. Sustained community self-government experiences are few, while the differential appeals of participation remain stark. The meager performance of

representative institutions vis-à-vis their prerogatives as top state authorities in their respective territories is also a negative factor. Naturally, rectifying such shortcomings will unavoidably require specific action designed to deformalize and revitalize participation, in addition to the specific institutional adjustments we have noted through the course of this chapter.

Rather than restating the argument, we would prefer to frame our conclusions within what might be termed a series of substantial systemic modifications, without which the constraints faced by community and local bodies, in terms of both participation and decision-making, may be difficult to surmount. In the final analysis, community bodies and local governments are just segments of a larger society and political system, and the former share with the latter not just their virtues, but also their limitations, which set the modalities and the pace.

A substantial primary principle is the need to advance more pluralistic political styles, which will eventually encourage greater vigor and autonomy on the part of civil society. From a logical point of view, the issue seems simple enough: every society is diverse — class, gender, generational differences exist, and so democratic public activity can be expressed only through pluralism. Politically, the issue is much more complex because, among other reasons, of the rejection professed by most Marxists for the very concept of pluralism, and also because of the limited use made of it by the liberal academy, which tends to limit the concept of democracy to institutional arrangements.

In the case of the Cuban revolution, this is also strongly conditioned by history. Although there have been different policies aimed towards certain sectors (such as women), it is also true that unity around the concept of ‘the people,’ rather than emphasis on diversity, has been seen as the best guarantor of the revolution’s agenda. Although three decades later unity is still vital, we ought to acknowledge that unwanted results have been produced in the process, mostly through unrealistic desires for unanimity and through holding a falsely monolithic paradigm of society as a measure of political success.

From this perspective, encouraging pluralism does not signify its reduction to the multi-party paradigm or elevate the latter to the status of a national historical goal. Various concrete theoretical and historical reasons lead us to believe that a multi-party system would have a counter-productive effect on furthering democratization and participation in Cuban society, and that in fact it would degrade many of the virtues of Cuban public activity in the heat of the political market-place. So far as local government is concerned, the point may very well be moot, since in many multi-party systems the dynamics of local activity exist outside party competition.

The opening of a space for socialist pluralism implies, above all, greater autonomy for political organizations participating in civil society, whose role cannot be reduced to that of a worn conveyor belt moving only one way — from the top down. This also implies reformulating the method of representation in state bodies. Finally, it implies recognizing conflict as a stage in building and guiding consensus, with the resolution of conflict proceeding through broader and more systematic public debate, both within and outside the Communist Party, whose political leadership role is in need of substantial democratization and anti-bureaucratic change. In the final analysis, within a single-party system, society will be only as democratic as the Party manages to be.

A second scenario of renewal deals with the status of municipal bodies as a segment of the public administration system that ought to have sufficient power to become fully responsible for its assigned governmental duties (i.e. decision-making, implementation and coaction) within its territorial jurisdiction. In other words, there must be changes in the balance between centralization and decentralization. This contradictory relationship (referred to in official documents as ‘the achievement of an adequate balance between centralization and decentralization’) is now of widespread importance, not just in reference to municipal issues.

The proven success of municipal government in meeting social needs wherever there is sufficient room for local planning, decision-making and deployment of human and financial resources is perhaps the most eloquent argument to be made in favor of greater political and administrative decentralization in Cuba. Only real proximity to power on the part of actual citizens in an autonomous, dynamic society will move beyond narrow mobilization and implementation objectives and towards popular participation that encourages initiative, greater oversight powers and effective control over public activities.

Far be it for us to suggest that the full answer to the numerous obstacles faced by the Cuban socialist project lies in the workings of local structures, or, from a systemic perspective, in the construction of a more participatory, pluralistic and decentralized system. Almost by definition, none of these proposals is a panacea, and the issues faced by Cuban society are, at any rate, extremely varied and diverse. What we wish to note is that no global solution can do without the democratic and participation goals explained here, and that, rather than economic effectiveness or technocratic efficiency, the main guarantee of socialist continuity will be its ability to move towards its historic goal of building a structure of human achievement without precedent in history. Such a goal, and the process of achieving it, is not an abstraction but an imperative of daily life.

Appendix: Methodology

Selection of municipalities and communities

One of the most acute methodological issues was selection of the municipalities where research would take place. We dispensed with the possibility of selecting a representative sample, since no previous studies existed and no reliable statistical basis could be obtained. We decided to choose a group of municipalities which presented sufficiently diverse characteristics to provide a variety of data that could then be compared. We analyzed a group of twelve possible candidates, and selected four of them on the basis of three basic criteria: population size, spatial relationship to central or provincial bodies, degree of coincidence between the legal and historical municipalities.

When selection was completed, we conducted a comprehensive statistical review of the economic, social and political-administrative organization in each locality. This allowed identification of both the basic issues and the main subjects present in each. Statistical analysis included a review of demands submitted during a six-month period and the type of response given by local government.

After identifying the principal subjects of our research, we used a set of instruments adapted to each situation. In general, we avoided quantitative measurement and emphasized the use of more intensive instruments to allow the active participation of subjects. Case studies were conducted on particular problems and issues. Initiatives undertaken in connection with each municipality were as follows:

1. Ordinary citizens A series of (non-participant) observations were conducted at the most relevant direct participation events, including neighborhood meetings, community projects, elections (one municipality only), etc. Various discussion groups were created. These functioned as workshops of great effectiveness, particularly where women’s groups were concerned.
2. Delegates A closed survey directed at 170 delegates was conducted. Some 151 responded. Delegates were also targeted for observation in places where they participated as community leaders or local government representatives. Lastly, we formed discussion groups in which 24 delegates participated.
3. Municipal Assemblies and Executive Committees We made observations at regular and special meetings, reviewed all available documentation, and conducted semi- and non-standard interviews. Several rounds of discussion with presidents and vice-presidents of local governments were held. Discussion groups were also formed with delegates and ordinary citizens who sat in Work Commissions.
4. Administrative Apparatus We conducted a number of interviews with administrators in local government, subordinated concerns, and national corporations in the jurisdiction.
5. Non-governmental political and social organizations Interviews were conducted with leaders in the Communist Party, the Federation of Cuban Women, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, labor unions, the Young Communist Union, and other groups represented in the community.

We also designed three case studies in order to establish the peculiarities of a locality in greater detail:

1. A study of elections in Santa Cruz del Norte, for which researchers stayed three months in the community. As elections take place simultaneously throughout the country, this could not be used elsewhere as it would have necessitated the deployment of specialized personnel we did not have. Methods used included observation, interviews, surveys, and a review of the documentation.
2. An analysis of administrative relationships between provinces and municipalities, on the basis of acknowledging the strong centralizing tendencies of provinces. This study was conducted in the province of Ciego de Avila and in the municipality of Chambas, where the relationship has been more strained. It included a documentary review, observations and interviews.
3. A study of the October 1990 creation of Popular Councils in Centro Habana. Councils are construed as an intermediate level between the municipality and the population. Pueblo Nuevo and Cayo Hueso Councils were selected, and several rounds of interviews and observations were conducted. The conclusions of case studies Band C are to be found in Haroldo Dilla and Gerardo González, Participación y desarrollo en los municipios cubanos (forthcoming).

Finally, as a contribution to the restructuring process taking place in the sub-system of municipal government, a number of measures were adopted to ensure rapid and systematic circulation of the data collected.

Notes

1. This study was funded with the generous support of the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa. This kind of study always involves a large number of assistants and a strong support network. In addition to the authors, several researchers took part in different stages of the project, including Armando Fernandez (who helped develop the original design and worked through the first stage of the project), Aurelio Alonso (who led the project for a time), Ilya Villar, Alfredo Prieto and Elina Peraza. Ana Teresa Vincentelli and Darlene Molina

deserve special mention. Aurelio Martinez, Humberto Pineiro, Ibis Pachot, Sonia Perez, Barbara Erice and Luis Mendez assisted us in different ways. We thank Juan Valdes Paz for his timely criticism, Magaly Pineda for her suggestions, Chris Smart for his encouragement, as well as Michael Kaufman and other members of our regional network for their support. Above all, we want to express our gratitude for the support and hospitality shown by the people and local authorities in our research regions and by the National Assembly of People’s Power.

2. Irving Horowitz, ‘Institutionalization as Integration: The Cuban Revolution at Age Twenty,’ Cuban Studies (July 1977).

3. Jorge Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).

4. C. Mesa Lago, Cuba in the 1970s. Pragmatism and Institutionalization (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978).

5. A. Ritter, ‘The Bodies of People’s Power and the Community Party: The Nature of Cuban Democracy,’ and R.P. Rabking, ‘Cuban Political Structures: Vanguard Party and athe Mases,’ both in S. Halebsky and J. Kirk, eds., Twenty-five Years of Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1985).

6. W Leogrande, Modes of Political Participation in Revolutionary Cuba (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977); and M. Azicri, ‘The Institutionalization of the Cuban State,’ Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 22, no. 3, 1980.

7. The empirical foundation of this section is to be found in a case study conducted in Santa Cruz del Norte in March-May 1989, later published as a working paper: H. Dilla and A. Fernández, ‘Las Elecciones Municipales en Cuba: Un Estudio de Caso,’ Caribe Contemporáneo, no. 23.

8. This assertion deserves a brief explanation. Certainly this rule was an attempt to keep Cuban elections away from either the then-Eastern European model or the liberal-democratic model. On the one hand, the issue was how to avoid the typical formalism prevailing in the Eastern European electoral system, with its single candidates with Party support. On the other hand, the proposed scheme rejected some competitive patterns implicit in the liberal-democratic model of an electoral market, such as campaigns, individual promotion, etc. The intention was to give the project a touch of originality, assigning a leading role to the popular component.

9. No Cuba-wide figures are available on the number of blank or spoiled ballots. Nevertheless, our own count in five Santa Cruz polling stations showed low numbers, close to 4 per cent spoiled and 3 per cent blank.

10. This is borne out in our survey answered by 151 delegates. Only 10 per cent said they had received some suggestion to accept the nomination, while 6 per cent said they were always or frequently told how to vote. Most of these were from Centro Habana, where conflict seemed to be more acute. The sources of these suggestions are varied, and appear to be generally motivated by a desire to secure a capable Executive body (for reasons we will explain later) or consensus on a particularly difficult topic.

11. R. Fernández and H. Dilla, ‘Cultura política y participación popular en Cuba,’ Cuadernos de Nuestra América, vol. III (July-December 1990).

12. The percentage of female delegates changes considerably from one municipality to the next. Centro Habana showed the highest figure (21 per cent) followed by Santa Cruz (17 per cent, similar to the national average.) However, in Chambas and Bayamo, the two more traditional areas in our study, the figure was closer to 12 per cent. At the same time, both the assembly president and secretary

in Chambas were women. These posts stood first and third in the local hierarchy, and local opinion was positive about their role.

13. A successful example of citizen involvement in oversight activities is Working Groups (Comisiones de Trabajo), which assist Municipal Assemblies by reporting on the status of social services or economic activity in the jurisdiction. Although the structure of Working Groups may vary from one municipality to another, they are usually chaired by a delegate and made up of delegates and ordinary citizens appointed on the basis of expertise or experience in the area to be supervised. Estimates indicate that some 20,000 citizens are permanently or occasionally involved nation-wide. Usually, these committees link up with networks of volunteer ‘people’s supervisors’ involved in the same field.

Our research looked at a total of nine such committees (two per municipality, three in Centro Habana) involving a total of 122 individuals, 52 per cent of whom were not delegates, but rather local residents with some degree of experience in the type of activity they supervised. For example, the Food Services Committee (this includes municipally owned cafeteria and restaurant services) in one municipality had eleven members, with nine as active participants. Three of these were delegates, including the chair, while the rest were there because of their food services expertise, including two pensioners who had worked in restaurants and cafeterias for more than 30 years.

Although only one-third of committee members are female, they tend to be predominant in committees supervising social service areas such as health and education, where the presence of women is traditionally significant. The presence of seniors and pensioners is also significant, as they possess the necessary experience and have more time to spare.

14. Eighty-three per cent of delegates surveyed thought the work of committees to be serious and efficient, yet only 23 per cent believed their recommendations and resolutions were taken sufficiently into account. The latter figure is higher in Chambas, Bayamo and Santa Cruz, and lower in Centro Habana. Nevertheless, over half of those asked expressed great satisfaction with the work of their committees, even if they thought their influence limited.

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